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Abstract—Compartmentalization is good security-engineering
practice. By breaking a large software system into mutually
distrustful components that run with minimal privileges, re-
stricting their interactions to conform to well-defined interfaces,
we can limit the damage caused by low-level attacks such as
control-flow hijacking. When used to defend against such attacks,
compartmentalization is often implemented cooperatively by a
compiler and a low-level compartmentalization mechanism. How-
ever, the formal guarantees provided by such compartmentalizing
compilation have seen surprisingly little investigation.
We propose a new security property, secure compartmentalizing
compilation (SCC), that formally characterizes the guarantees
provided by compartmentalizing compilation and clarifies its
attacker model. We reconstruct our property by starting from
the well-established notion of fully abstract compilation, then
identifying and lifting three important limitations that make
standard full abstraction unsuitable for compartmentalization.
The connection to full abstraction allows us to prove SCC by
adapting established proof techniques; we illustrate this with
a compiler from a simple unsafe imperative language with
procedures to a compartmentalized abstract machine.
1 Introduction
Computer systems are distressingly insecure. Visiting a web-
site, opening an email, or serving a client request is often all
it takes to be subjected to a control-hijacking attack. These
devastating low-level attacks typically exploit memory-safety
vulnerabilities such as buffer overflows, use-after-frees, or
double frees, which are abundant in large software systems.
Various techniques have been proposed for guaranteeing mem-
ory safety [12], [20], [25], [44], [51]–[55], but the challenges
of efficiency [54], [55], precision [62], scalability [74], back-
wards compatibility [16], and effective deployment [12], [20],
[24], [25], [44], [51]–[53] have hampered their widespread
adoption.
Meanwhile, new mitigation techniques have been pro-
posed to deal with the most onerous consequences of mem-
ory unsafety—for instance, techniques aimed at preventing
control-flow hijacking even in unsafe settings [2], [3], [15],
[26], [68]. Unfortunately, these defenses often underestimate
the power of the attackers they may face [18], [26], [28],
[29], [32], [67]—if, indeed, they have any clear model at
all of what they are protecting against. Clarifying the precise
security properties and attacker models of practical mitigation
techniques is thus an important research problem—and a
challenging one, since a good model has to capture not only
the defense mechanism itself but also the essential features of
the complex world in which low-level attacks occur.
In this paper we focus on the use of compartmentaliza-
tion [13], [33], [70] as a strong, practical defense mechanism
against low-level attacks exploiting memory unsafety. The key
idea is to break up a large software system into mutually dis-
trustful components that run with minimal privileges and can
interact only via well-defined interfaces. This is not only good
software engineering; it also gives strong security benefits.
In particular, control-hijacking attacks can compromise only
specific components with exploitable vulnerabilities, and thus
only give the attacker direct control over the privileges held
by these components. Also, because compartmentalization can
be enforced by more coarse-grained mechanisms, acceptable
efficiency and backwards compatibility are generally easier
to achieve than for techniques enforcing full-blown memory
safety.
When used as a defense mechanism against memory un-
safety, compartmentalization is often achieved via cooperation
between a compiler and a low-level compartmentalization
mechanism [16], [33], [39], [42], [61], [70], [72]. In this paper
we use compartmentalizing compilation to refer to cooperative
implementations of this sort. The compiler might, for instance,
insert dynamic checks and cleanup code when switching
components and provide information about components and
their interfaces to the low-level compartmentalizing mecha-
nism, which generally provides at least basic isolation. Two
such low-level compartmentalization technologies are already
widely deployed: process-level privilege separation [13], [33],
[40] (used, e.g., by OpenSSH [63] and for sandboxing plugins
and tabs in modern web browsers [64]) and software fault
isolation [69] (provided, e.g., by Google Native Client [71]);
many more are on the drawing boards [12], [16], [34], [61],
[70].
So what security guarantees does compartmentalizing com-
pilation provide, and what, exactly, is its attacker model?
A good starting point for addressing these questions is the
familiar notion of fully abstract compilation [1], [4]–[6], [8],
[10], [11], [31], [35], [56], [58]. A fully abstract compiler
toolchain (compiler, linker, loader, and underlying architecture
with its security mechanisms) protects the interactions between
a compiled program and its low-level environment, allowing
programmers to reason soundly about the behavior of their
code when it is placed in an arbitrary target-language context,
by considering only its behavior in arbitrary source-language
contexts. In particular, if we link the code produced by
such a compiler against arbitrary low-level libraries—perhaps
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compiled from an unsafe language or even written directly in
assembly—the resulting execution will not be any less secure
than if we had restricted ourselves to library code written in
the same high-level language as the calling program.
(Why is it useful to restrict attention to attackers written
in a high-level language? First, because reasoning about what
attackers might do—in particular, what privileges they might
exercise—is easier in a high-level language. And second, be-
cause by phrasing the property in terms of low- and high-level
programs rather than directly in terms of attacker behaviors,
specific notions of privilege, etc., we can re-use the same
property for many different languages.)
Since full abstraction works by partitioning the world into
a program and its context, one might expect it to apply to
compartmentalized programs as well: some set of components
that are assumed to be subject to control-hijacking attacks
could be grouped into the “low-level context,” while some
others that are assumed to be immune to such attacks would
constitute the “high-level program.” Full abstraction would
then allow us to reason about the possible behaviors of
the whole system using the simplifying assumption that the
attacker’s injected behavior for the compromised components
can be expressed in the same high-level language as the
good components. Sadly, this intuition does not withstand
closer examination. Full abstraction, as previously formulated
in the literature, suffers from three important limitations that
make it unsuitable for characterizing the security guarantees
of compartmentalizing compilation.
First, fully abstract compilation assumes that the source
language itself is secure, so that it makes sense to define
target-level security with respect to the semantics of the
source language. However, compartmentalization is often ap-
plied to languages like C and C++, which do not have
a secure semantics—the C and C++ standards leave most
of the security burden to the programmer by calling out a
large number of undefined behaviors, including memory-safety
violations, that are assumed never to occur. Valid compilers
for these languages are allowed to generate code that does
literally anything—in particular, anything a remote attacker
may want—when applied to inputs that lead to undefined
behavior. There is no way to tell, statically, whether or not a
program may have undefined behavior, and compilers do not
check for this situation. (Indeed, not only do they not check:
they aggressively exploit the assumption of no undefined
behaviors to produce the fastest possible code for well-defined
programs, often leading to easily exploitable behaviors when
this assumption is broken.) The point of compartmentalizing
compilation is to ensure that the potential effects of undefined
behavior are limited to the compromise of the component in
which it occurs: other components can only be influenced
by compromised ones via controlled interactions respecting
specified interfaces.
To characterize the security of compartmentalizing compi-
lation, we therefore need a formal property that can mean-
ingfully accommodate source languages in which components
can be compromised via undefined behavior. Full abstraction
as conventionally formulated does not fit the bill, because,
in order to preserve equivalences of programs with undefined
behavior, compilers must abandon the aggressive optimizations
that are the reason for allowing undefined behaviors in the
first place. To see this, consider C expressions buf[42] and
buf[43] that read at different positions outside the bounds of
a buffer buf. These two programs are equivalent at the source
level: they both lead to arbitrary behavior. However, a real C
compiler would never compile these expressions to equivalent
code, since this would require runtime checks that many C
programmers would deem too expensive.
Second, fully abstract compilation makes an open world
assumption about the attacker context. While the context is
normally required to be compatible with the protected pro-
gram, for instance by respecting the program’s typed interface,
the structure and privilege of the context are unrestricted (the
full abstraction definition quantifies over arbitrary low-level
contexts). This comes in direct contradiction with the idea
of least privilege, which is crucial to compartmentalization,
and which relies on the fact that even if a component is
compromised, it does not immediately get more privilege.
Compromised components cannot change the basic rules of
the compartmentalization game. For instance, in this paper
we consider a static compartmentalization setting, in which
the breakup of the application into components is fixed in
advance, as are the privileges of each component. A security
property suitable for this setting needs to be restricted to
contexts that conform to a fixed breakup into components with
static privileges.1
Third, because the definition of full abstraction involves ap-
plying the compiler only to a program and not to the untrusted
context in which it runs, a fully abstract compiler may choose
to achieve its protection goals by introducing just a single
barrier around the trusted part to protect it from the untrusted
part [8], [45], [57], [58], [60]. Such compilation schemes force
the programmer to commit in advance to a single compromise
scenario, i.e., to a single static split of their application into a
“good” trusted program and an “evil” untrusted context from
which this program has to be protected. This is not realistic
in the setting of compartmentalizing compilation, where we
generally cannot predict which components may be vulnerable
to compromise by control hijacking attacks, and instead must
simultaneously guard against multiple compromise scenarios.
Compartmentalizing compilers allow us to build more secure
applications that go beyond the blunt trusted/untrusted dis-
tinction made by some fully abstract compilers. To describe
their guarantees accurately, we thus need a new property that
captures the protection obtained by breaking up applications
into multiple mutually distrustful components, each running
with least privilege, and that permits reasoning about multiple
scenarios in which different subsets of these components are
1In a setting where new components can be dynamically created and
privileges can be exchanged dynamically between components, the details of
this story will be more complicated; still, we expect any secure compartmen-
talizing compilation property to limit the ability of low-level attacker contexts
to “forge” the privileges of existing components.
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compromised.
Our main contribution is the definition of such a property,
which we call secure compartmentalizing compilation (SCC)
(§2). While similar in many respects to full abstraction,
our property escapes the three limitations discussed above.
First, it applies to unsafe source languages with undefined
behaviors by introducing a new notion of fully defined sets of
components. While undefined behavior is a property of whole
programs, full definedness is compositional. Intuitively, a set
of components is fully defined if they cannot be blamed [30]
for undefined behavior in any context satisfying fixed inter-
faces. Second, SCC makes a closed-world assumption about
compromised components, enforcing the basic rules of the
compartmentalization game like the fixed division into com-
ponents and the fixed privileges of each component, including
for instance with which other components it is allowed to
interact. Third, SCC ensures protection for multiple, mutu-
ally distrustful components; it does not assume we know in
advance which components are going to be compromised (i.e.,
in the C setting, which components may contain exploitable
undefined behaviors), but instead explicitly quantifies over all
possible compromise scenarios.
Our second contribution is relating SCC to standard for-
mulations of full abstraction both intuitively and formally
(§3). We start from full abstraction and show how the three
limitations that make it unsuitable in our setting can be
lifted one by one. This results in two properties we call
structured full abstraction and separate compilation, which
can be combined and instantiated to obtain SCC. While our
property directly captures the intuition of our attacker model,
reducing it to structured full abstraction is a useful technical
step, since the latter is easier to establish for specific examples
using a variant of existing proof techniques. Moreover, arriving
at the same property by two different paths increases our
confidence that we found the right property.
Our third contribution is establishing the SCC property
for a simple unsafe imperative language with components
interacting via procedure calls and returns, compiling to an
abstract machine with protected compartments (§4). Despite
the simplicity of the setting, this result gives useful insights.
First, the source language and compilation strategy enable
interesting attacks on components with potential buffer over-
flows, similar to those found in C. Second, we illustrate
how SCC can be achieved by the cooperation of a compiler
(cleaning and restoring registers) and a low-level protection
mechanism (totally isolating compartments and providing a
secure interaction mechanism using calls and returns). Third,
our SCC proof adapts a standard technique called trace seman-
tics [37], [59], via the reduction to structured full abstraction.
The closed-world assumption about the context made by
structured full abstraction requires some nontrivial changes to
the trace semantics proof technique.
The remainder of the paper describes each of our three
contributions in detail (§2–§4) and closes by discussing re-
lated work (§5) and future directions (§6). The supplemen-
tal materials associated with this paper includes: (a) a Coq
proof for Theorem 3.4; (b) technical details and proofs for
the SCC instance from §4 (while most of these proofs are
done only on paper, the main structured full abstraction
result, Theorem 4.7, is also proved in Coq); and (c) a trace
mapping algorithm in OCaml using property-based testing to
support Assumption 4.9. These materials can be found at:
https://github.com/secure-compilation/beyond-good-and-evil
2 Secure Compartmentalizing Compilation
We start with an intuitive explanation of compartmentalizing
compilation, its attacker model, and its security benefits, and
then introduce secure compartmentalizing compilation (SCC).
We consider compartmentalization mechanisms provided by
the compiler and runtime system for an unsafe programming
language with some notion of components.2 In §4 we will
present a simple example in detail, but for the present dis-
cussion it suffices to think informally of C or C++ enriched
with some compartmentalization mechanism. This mechanism
allows security-conscious developers to break large applica-
tions into mutually distrustful components running with least
privilege and interacting only via well-defined interfaces. We
assume that the interface of each component also gives a
precise description of its privilege. Our notion of interface
here is quite generic: interfaces might include any information
that can be dynamically enforced on components, including
module signatures, lists of allowed system calls, or more de-
tailed access control specifications describing legal parameters
to inter-component calls (e.g., ACLs for files). We assume
that the division of the application into components and the
interfaces of those components are statically determined and
fixed throughout execution. In §4, we instantiate this picture
with a rather simple and rigid notion of components and
interfaces, where components don’t directly share any state
and where the only thing one component can do to another
one is to call the procedures allowed by the interfaces of both
components.
We do not fix a specific compartmentalizing compilation
mechanism; we just assume that whatever mechanism is cho-
sen can guarantee that, even if one component is compromised
(e.g., by a control-hijacking attack), it will still be forced
to adhere to its specified interface in its interactions with
other components. What a compromised component can do
in this model is use its access to other components, as
allowed by its interface, to trick them into misusing their
own privileges (confused deputy attacks) and/or attempt to
mount further control-hijacking attacks on other components
by communicating with them via defined interfaces.
We do not assume we know in advance which components
will be compromised: the compartmentalizing compilation
mechanism has to protect each component from all the others.
This allows developers to reason informally about various
compromise scenarios and their impact on the security of
2We use the term “runtime system” loosely to include operating system
mechanisms [13], [33], [40], [63], [64] and/or hardware protections [12], [34],
[61], [70] that may be used by the compiler.
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the whole application [33], relying on conditional reasoning
of the form: “If these components get taken over and these
do not, then this might happen (while that cannot), whereas
if these other components get taken over, then this other
thing might happen...” If the practical consequences of some
plausible compromise scenario are too serious, developers can
further reduce or separate privilege by narrowing interfaces
or splitting components, or they can make components more
defensive by dynamically validating the inputs they receive
from other components.
For instance, developers of a compartmentalized web
browser [64] might reason about situations in which some
subset of plugins and tabs gets compromised and how this
might impact the browser kernel and the remaining plugins and
tabs. A possible outcome of this exercise might be noticing
that, if the browser kernel itself is compromised, then all
bets are off for all the components and the application as a
whole, so the developers should put extra energy in defending
the kernel against attacks from compromised plugins or tabs.
On the other hand, if interfaces between tabs and plugins
are appropriately limited, then compromise of one should not
disrupt the rest.
Our goal is to articulate a security property that supports
reasoning about multiple compromise scenarios and clarifies
the associated attacker model. At the same time, our property
is intended to serve as a benchmark for developers of com-
partmentalizing compilation mechanisms who want to argue
formally that their mechanisms are secure. In the rest of this
section we explain the technical ideas behind the SCC property
and then give its formal definition.
An application is a set Cs of components, with corre-
sponding interfaces CIs. These components are separately
compiled (individually compiling each component in the set
Cs is written Cs↓) and linked together (written ./(Cs↓)) to
form an executable binary for the application.
SCC quantifies over all compromise scenarios—i.e., over all
ways of partitioning the components into a set of compromised
ones and a set of uncompromised ones. In order to ensure that
the set of compromised components doesn’t expand during
evaluation, we require that the uncompromised components be
fully defined with respect to the interfaces of the compromised
components. That is, the uncompromised components must
not exhibit undefined behaviors even if we replace the com-
promised components with arbitrary code (obeying the same
interfaces).
The full definedness condition is a necessary part of the
static compromise model considered in this paper. Intuitively,
if an uncompromised component can be tricked into an un-
defined behavior by interface-respecting communication with
other components, then we need to conservatively assume that
the already compromised components will succeed in compro-
mising this component dynamically, so it belongs in the set
of compromised components from the start. This static model
is much simpler to reason about than a model of dynamic
compromise, in which one could perhaps provide guarantees
to not-fully-defined components up to the point at which
they exhibit undefined behavior, but which could, however,
invalidate standard compiler optimizations that involve code
motion. Moreover, it seems highly nontrivial to define our
property for such a more complex model.
Figure 1 illustrates one way to partition five components
C1, . . . , C5 with interfaces i1, . . . , i5, representing the scenario
where C2, C4, and C5 are compromised and C1 and C3 are
not. In order for this compromise scenario to be considered by
our property, C1 and C3 need to be fully defined with respect
to interfaces i2, i4, and i5, which means C1 and C3 cannot
cause undefined behaviors when linked with any components
B2, B4, B5 satisfying interfaces i2, i4, i5.
Formally, full definedness is a language-specific parameter
to our definition of SCC, just as the program equivalence
relations are language-specific parameters to both SCC and
vanilla full abstraction. For instance, in the simple imperative
language in §4, we will say that components Cs are fully
defined with respect to a set of adversary interfaces BIs if,
for all components Bs satisfying BIs, the complete program
./(Cs ↓∪ Bs ↓) cannot reduce to a stuck non-final state
(corresponding to undefined behavior) where the currently
executing component is one of the ones in Cs (i.e., no com-
ponent in Cs can be “blamed” [30] for undefined behavior).
Full definedness might well be defined differently for another
language; for instance, in a concurrent language undefined
behaviors cannot be as easily modeled by stuckness since
normally other threads can proceed even if one of the threads
is stuck. One last thing to note is that full definedness of a
set of components is generally a much weaker property than
the full definedness of each individual component in the set.
Since the interfaces of the adversary components BIs can (and
in §4 do) restrict not only the operations they export but also
the operations they import from Cs, the components in the
set can export dangerous operations just to other components
in the set; the components actually in the set might then all
use these operations properly, whereas arbitrary components
with the same interfaces could abuse them to trigger undefined
behaviors.
SCC states that, in all such compromise scenarios, the
compiled compromised components must not be able to cause
more harm to the compiled uncompromised components via
low-level attacks than can be caused by some high-level
components written in the source language. Basically this
means that any low-level attack can be mapped back to a high-
level attack by compromised components satisfying the given
interfaces. The property additionally ensures that the high-level
components produced by this “mapping back” are fully defined
with respect to the interfaces of the uncompromised compo-
nents. So with SCC, instead of having to reason about the low-
level consequences of undefined behavior in the compromised
components, we can reason in the source language and simply
replace the compromised components by equivalent ones that
are guaranteed to cause no undefined behavior.
Formally, SCC is stated by quantifying over multiple distin-
guishability games, one for each compromise scenario, where
the individual games are reminiscent of full abstraction. The
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Any partition 
With one condition: C1 and C3 fully defined 
i.e. no B2, B4, and B5 can compromise C1 and C3 by 
tricking them into triggering undefined behavior 
i1 i2 i3 i4 i5 
C1 B2 C3 B4 B5 
i1 i2 i3 i4 i5 
C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 
i1 i2 i3 i4 i5 
C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 
Compartmentalized application 
↯ ↯ ↯ 
↯ ↯ ↯ 
Figure 1. Compromise scenarios
i1 i2 i3 i4 i5 
C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ 
i1 i2 i3 i4 i5 
C1 A2 C3 A4 A5 
i1 i2 i3 i4 i5 
D1 C2 D3 C4 C5 ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ 
≁ 
i1 i2 i3 i4 i5 
D1 A2 D3 A4 A5 
≁ 
∀ low-level attack from compromised C2↓, C4↓, C5↓ ∃ high-level attack from some fully defined A2, A4, A5 
L 
H 
↯ 
↯ 
↯ ↯ 
↯ ↯ 
Figure 2. SCC distinguishability game, for one of the compromise scenarios
goal of the attacker in each game is to distinguish between
two variants of the uncompromised components. Figure 2
illustrates these two variants as C1, C3 and D1, D3, where we
use 6∼H and 6∼L to indicate that the behaviors of two (high-
or low-level) complete programs are distinguishable, i.e., they
produce different observable outcomes when executed. For
this compromise scenario, SCC specifies that, if compiled
compromised components C2↓, C4↓, C5↓ can distinguish the
C1↓, C3↓ and D1↓, D3↓ variants at the low level, then there
must exist some (fully defined) components A2, A4, A5 that
distinguish C1, C3 and D1, D3 at the high level.
With all this in mind, the SCC property is formally ex-
pressed as follows:
Definition 2.1 (SCC).
• For any complete compartmentalized program and for all
ways of partitioning this program into a set of uncom-
promised components Cs and their interfaces CIs, and a
set of compromised components Bs and their interfaces
BIs, so that Cs is fully defined with respect to BIs, and
• for all ways of replacing the uncompromised components
with components Ds that satisfy the same interfaces CIs
and are fully defined with respect to BIs,
• if ./(Cs↓∪ Bs↓) 6∼L ./(Ds↓∪ Bs↓),
• then there exist components As satisfying interfaces BIs
and fully defined with respect to CIs such that
./(Cs ∪ As) 6∼H ./(Ds ∪ As).
As suggested before, our property applies to any fully
defined sets of components Cs and Ds (which cannot be dy-
namically compromised by some components with interfaces
BIs). We conjecture that this full definedness precondition
is strictly required in the static corruption model we are
assuming. It is worth noting that we are not proposing any
method for proving that programs are fully defined; this comes
with the territory when dealing with C-like languages. What
we are after is bringing formal foundations to conditional
reasoning of the form “if these Cs are fully defined and the
remaining components Bs get compromised, then...”
Note that the Bs in our SCC definition need not be fully
defined—i.e., the property allows the compromised compo-
nents to contain undefined behaviors (this may well be why
they are compromised!) and promises that, even if they do, we
can find some other components As that are able to distinguish
between Cs and Ds in the source language without causing any
undefined behaviors. Indeed, for those compromise scenarios
in which Bs are already fully defined, our SCC property
trivially follows from correct compilation (Assumption 4.2)
since in that case we can always pick As = Bs.
This generic property is parameterized over a source and a
target language with a notion of component for each, source-
and target-level notions of linking sets of components (./),
source- and target-level notions of distinguishability (6∼), a
compiler mapping source components to target components
(↓), a source-level notion of interface and an interface satis-
faction relation (lifted to sets of components and interfaces),
and a notion of a set of components Cs being fully defined
with respect to a set of adversary interfaces BIs.
3 From Full Abstraction to SCC
§2 presented SCC by directly characterizing the attacker model
against which it defends. In this section we step back and show
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how SCC can instead be obtained by starting from the well-
established notion of full abstraction and removing each of the
three limitations that make it unsuitable in our setting. This re-
sults in two properties, structured full abstraction and separate
compilation, which we then combine and instantiate to obtain
SCC. This reduction is not only theoretically interesting, but
also practically useful, since structured full abstraction can
more easily be proved by adapting existing proof techniques,
as we will see in §4.
Full abstraction A fully abstract compiler protects compiled
programs from their interaction with unsafe low-level code
and thus allows sound reasoning about security (and other
aspects of program behavior) in terms of the source language.
Fully abstract compilation [1] intuitively states that no low-
level attacker can do more harm to a compiled program
than some program in the source language already could.
This strong property requires enforcing all high-level language
abstractions against arbitrary low-level attackers.
Formally, full abstraction is phrased as a distinguishability
game requiring that low-level attackers have no more distin-
guishing power than high-level ones.
Definition 3.1. We call a compilation function (written ↓) fully
abstract if, for all P and Q,
(∀A. A[P ]∼H A[Q])⇒ (∀a. a[P↓]∼L a[Q↓]).
Here, P and Q are partial programs, A is a high-level context
whose job is to try to distinguish P from Q, and a is a low-
level “attacker context” that tries to distinguish P↓ from Q↓.
The relations ∼L and ∼H are parameters to the definition,
representing behavioral equivalence at the two levels. To be
useful, they should allow the context to produce an observ-
able action every time it has control, letting it convert its
knowledge into observable behaviors. For instance, a common
choice for behavioral equivalence is based on termination: two
deterministic programs are behaviorally equivalent if they both
terminate or both diverge.
When stated this way (as an implication rather than an
equivalence), full abstraction is largely orthogonal to compiler
correctness [43], [46]. While compiler correctness is about
preserving behaviors when compiling from the source to the
target, proving full abstraction requires some way to map each
distinguishing context target to a sourge-level one, which goes
in the opposite direction. This is easiest to see by looking at
the contrapositive:
∀a. a[P↓] 6∼L a[Q↓]⇒ ∃A. A[P ] 6∼H A[Q]
Problem 1: Undefined behavior The first limitation of
full abstraction is that it cannot realistically be applied to
compiling from an unsafe language with undefined behav-
iors. Undefined behaviors are (arbitrarily!) nondeterministic,
and no realistic compiler can preserve this nondeterminism
in the target as required by full abstraction. (Removing it
from the source language would negate the performance and
optimization benefits that are the reason for allowing undefined
behaviors in the first place.)
To adapt full abstraction to a source language with unde-
fined behaviors, we need to restrict attention only to defined
complete programs in the source language. And even with this
restriction, defining full abstraction still requires a little care.
For instance, the following variant is wrong (formally, defined
is another parameter to this property):
(∀A. A[P ] and A[Q] defined ⇒ A[P ]∼H A[Q]) ⇒
(∀a. a[P↓]∼L a[Q↓])
Any P and Q that both trigger undefined behavior as soon as
they get control would be considered equivalent in the high-
level language because there is no context that can make these
programs defined while observing some difference between
them. All such programs would thus need to be equivalent
at the low level, which is clearly not the case (since their
nondeterminism can be resolved in different ways by the
compiler). The problem here is that if P and Q trigger
undefined behavior then the context often cannot make up for
that and make the program defined in order be able to cause
an observation that distinguishes P and Q.
Solution 1: Full abstraction for unsafe languages The
responsibility of keeping A[P ] defined should be thus shared
between A and P . For this we assume a compositional notion
of fully defined behavior for programs and contexts as two
parameters to Definition 3.2 below. We require that these
parameters satisfy the following properties: (1) a program
is fully defined if it does not cause undefined behavior in
any fully defined context, and (2) a context is fully defined
if it does not cause undefined behavior when we plug any
fully defined program into it. Note that properties (1) and (2)
are circular and therefore cannot be used as the definition
of full definedness. For specific languages (e.g., the one in
§4) we can break this circularity and define full definedness
using blame [30]: intuitively we call a partial program fully
defined when it cannot be blamed for undefined behavior in
any context whatsoever. Similarly, we call a context fully
defined when it cannot be blamed for undefined behavior for
any program that we plug into it. We expect such a blame-
based definition to satisfy the properties (1) and (2) above.
Full definedness allows us to introduce a new variant of
full abstraction that applies to unsafe source languages with
undefined behavior:
Definition 3.2 (Full abstraction for unsafe languages).
We call a compiler ↓ for an unsafe language fully abstract if
for all fully defined partial programs P and Q
(∀A. A fully defined⇒ A[P ]∼H A[Q]) ⇒
(∀a. a[P↓]∼L a[Q↓]).
Requiring that P , Q, and A are fully defined means that we
can safely apply ∼H to A[P ] and A[Q], because neither the
programs nor the context can cause undefined behavior. This
property is incomparable with the original definition of full
abstraction. Looking at the contrapositive,
∀P,Q fully defined. (∃a. a[P↓] 6∼L a[Q↓])
⇒ (∃A. A fully defined ∧A[P ] 6∼H A[Q]),
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the P,Q fully defined pre-condition makes this weaker than
full abstraction, while the A fully defined post-condition makes
it stronger. The post-condition greatly simplifies reasoning
about programs by allowing us to replace reasoning about
low-level contexts with reasoning about high-level contexts
that cannot cause undefined behavior.
One might wonder whether the P,Q fully defined pre-
condition is too restrictive, since full definedness is a rather
strong property, requiring each component to be very defensive
about validating inputs it receives from others. In the static
compromise model inherent to full abstraction and without
additional restrictions on the program’s context, we must
be conservative and assume that, if any context can cause
undefined behavior in a program, it can compromise it in
a way that the compiler can provide no guarantees for this
program. The structured full abstraction definition below will
in fact restrict the context and thus use a weaker notion of full
definedness. Moreover, separate compilation will allow us to
quantify over all splits of a program into a fully defined partial
program and a compromised context, which also makes the
presence of the full definedness pre-condition more palatable.
Problem 2: Open-world assumption about contexts While
full abstraction normally requires the contexts to be compatible
with the partial program, for instance by respecting the partial
program’s typed interface, these restrictions are minimal and
do not restrict the shape, size, exported interface, or privilege
of the contexts in any way. This open world assumption about
contexts does not fit with our compartmentalization setting, in
which the breakup of the application into components is fixed
in advance, as are the interfaces (and thus privileges) of all the
components. In our setting, the definition of full abstraction
needs to be refined to track and respect such structural
constraints; otherwise a low-level context with 2 components
might be mapped back to a high-level context with, say, 3
components that have completely different interfaces, and thus
privileges. In particular, the high-level components’ interfaces
could give them more privileges than the low-level components
had, increasing their distinguishing power.
Solution 2: Structured full abstraction We therefore intro-
duce a structured variant of full abstraction, in which partial
programs (indicated by • below) and contexts (◦) are assigned
dual parts of predefined complete program shapes. A shape
might be anything, from a division into components with their
interfaces (as in Theorem 3.4 below), to, e.g., the maximum
size of a component’s code after compilation (which might
expose component sizes in a setting where it’s too costly to
hide them by padding to a fixed maximum size [61]).
Definition 3.3 (Structured full abstraction).
We say that a compiler ↓ for an unsafe language satisfies
structured full abstraction if, for all program shapes s and
partial programs P ∈• s and Q ∈• s so that P and Q are
fully defined with respect to contexts of shape ◦s,( ∀A ∈◦ s. A fully defined wrt. programs of shape •s
⇒ A[P ]∼H A[Q]
)
⇒ (∀a ∈◦ s. a[P↓]∼L a[Q↓]).
This property universally quantifies over any complete pro-
gram shape s and requires that P ∈• s (read “program P
has shape s”), Q ∈• s, and A ∈◦ s (“context A matches
programs of shape s”). Moreover, the property only requires
programs that are fully defined with respect to contexts of the
right shape, and dually it only considers contexts that are fully
defined with respect to programs of the right shape.
Recovering secure compartmentalizing compilation SCC
can be recovered in a natural way as an instance of structured
full abstraction (Definition 3.3). For both source and target
languages, we take partial programs and contexts be sets of
components and context application be set union. Compilation
of sets of components works pointwise. To obtain an instance
of structured full abstraction we additionally take shapes to be
sets of component interfaces, where each interface is marked
as either compromised or uncompromised.
Theorem 3.4. For any deterministic target language and any
source language that is deterministic for defined programs,
structured full abstraction instantiated to components as de-
scribed above implies SCC.
Proof. Straightforward, though tedious. A machine-checked
Coq proof can be found in the auxiliary materials.
Problem 3: Statically known trusted/untrusted split
While SCC can deal with multiple compromise scenarios, not
all instances of structured full abstraction can. In general, if
a compiler satisfies (structured) full abstraction, how can we
know whether it can deal with multiple compromise scenarios,
and what does that even mean? While we can instantiate full
abstraction to a particular compromise scenario by letting the
partial program P contain the uncompromised components
and the low-level context a contain the compromised ones,
a fully abstract compiler (together with its linker, loader,
runtime etc.) might exploit this static split and introduce only
one single barrier protecting the uncompromised components
from the compromised ones. When presented with a different
compromise scenario for the same program, the compiler could
adapt and produce a different output.
The source of confusion here is that a fully abstract compiler
does not need to compile contexts—only programs. In fact,
even the types of contexts and of partial programs might well
be completely different (e.g., the types of lambda calculus
contexts and terms are different; a compiler for one cannot
compile the other). Even when the types do match so that
we can apply the same compiler to the context, the low-level
context-application operation A↓ [P ↓] can freely exploit the
fact that its first argument is a compiled untrusted context and
its second argument is a compiled trusted program that should
be protected from the context. So if we start with a complete
high-level program C and look at two different compromise
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scenarios C = A1[P1] and C = A2[P2], compiling each of the
parts and combining the results using context application does
not necessarily yield the same result (i.e., it could well be that
A1↓[P1↓] 6= A2↓[P2↓]) or indeed even behaviorally equivalent
results (i.e., it could well be that A1↓[P1↓] 6∼L A2↓[P2↓]). This
means that the user of a fully abstract compiler may need to
commit in advance to a single compromise scenario.
This weakness significantly limits the applicability of full
abstraction. After all, uncertainty about sources of vulner-
ability is precisely the motivation for compartmentalizing
compilation: if we knew which components were safe and
which were not, there would be no reason to distinguish more
than two levels of privilege, and we could merge each group
into a single mega-component. Even in rare cases where we are
certain that some code cannot be compromised—for instance
because we have proved it safe—protecting only the verified
code from all the rest using a fully abstract compiler [7] is
still suboptimal in terms of protection, since it provides no
guarantees for all the code that is not verified.
Moreover, this weakness is not hypothetical: several fully
abstract compilers proposed in the literature are only capa-
ble of protecting a single trusted module from its untrusted
context [8], [45], [57], [58], [60] (recently proposed exten-
sions [61] do aim at lifting this restriction in some cases).
While this setup is appropriate when all one wants to achieve
is protecting trusted (e.g., verified) code from its untrusted
context [7], it is not suitable for our compartmentalizing
compilation setting where we do not know in advance which
components will be dynamically compromised and which ones
not, and thus we want to simultaneously protect against all
possible compromise scenarios.
Solution 3: Separate compilation We can address this by
requiring that the compiler toolchain have one additional
property:
Definition 3.5. We say that the compiler toolchain (i.e., the
compiler −↓, the linker −[−], and the runtime system embod-
ied in the low-level behavioral equivalence) satisfies separate
compilation if
1) the type of contexts and programs is the same (so that
the compiler can also compile contexts), and
2) (A[P ])↓ ∼L A↓[P↓] for all A and P .
Requiring that context application and compilation commute
(condition 2) implies that, if some complete program C can be
written as both C = A1[P1] and C = A2[P2], then separately
compiling each of these splits yields behaviorally equivalent
results: (A1[P1])↓ ∼L (A2[P2])↓. With separate compilation,
full abstraction for an unsafe language (Definition 3.2) can be
instantiated as follows:
∀B. ∀P,Q fully defined. ((B[P ])↓ 6∼L(B[Q])↓)
⇒ (∃A. A fully defined ∧A[P ] 6∼H A[Q])
One compelling reading of this is that, for all compromise
scenarios (ways to break a complete program into a compro-
mised context B and an uncompromised program P ), and for
all programs Q that we can substitute for P , if the context B
can distinguish P from Q when compiled to low-level code,
then there exists a fully defined context A that can distinguish
them at the high-level.
In a language without undefined behavior, this property
would trivially follow just from (whole program) correct
compilation (see Assumption 4.2 below) by picking A = B.
However, it is nontrivial for a language in which context B
might cause undefined behavior, since then correct compilation
does not apply for B[P ] and B[Q]. In our setting, this
property allows us to avoid reasoning about the implications of
undefined behavior in a low-level context and instead consider
just fully defined high-level contexts.
It is trivial to check that our instance of structured full ab-
straction from Theorem 3.4 does satisfy separate compilation.
It should also be easy to show that many previous fully abstract
compilers [8], [45], [57], [58], [60] do not satisfy separate
compilation, since they were not designed to support a setting
of mutual distrust.
4 A Simple Instance of SCC
In this section, we illustrate the main ideas behind SCC
with a proof-of-concept compiler from an unsafe language
with components to an abstract machine with compartments.
We discuss key design decisions for providing secure com-
partmentalization, such as cleaning register values to prevent
unintended communication between compartments. We also
explain how a compiler optimization for component-local calls
makes unwary compiled components vulnerable to realistic
control-flow hijacking attacks. Finally, we show how to adapt
a standard full abstraction proof technique called trace seman-
tics [58] to prove SCC.
The results in this section have been proved on paper
under the assumptions explicitly mentioned in the text. In the
following, an assumption denotes a property that we believe
is true and rely on, but that we haven’t proved. Lemmas,
theorems and corollaries denote properties that we have proved
on paper, possibly relying on some of the stated assumptions.
The proof of the structured full abstraction theorem (The-
orem 4.7) has also been formalized in Coq assuming most
other results in this section as axioms, with the exception of
Theorem 4.1 and Corollary 4.3 which are also mechanized.
While not constituting a complete machine-checked proof, this
mechanization further validates the high-level proof structure
described in this section.
Source Language We work with an unsafe source language
with components, procedures, and buffers. A program in
this language is a set of components communicating via
procedure calls. Buffer overflows have undefined behavior and
may open the door to low-level attacks after compilation.
However, thanks to the cooperation between the low-level
compartmentalization mechanism and the compiler, the effects
of these attacks will be limited to the offending component.
Components have statically checked interfaces that spec-
ify which procedures they import and export. To satisfy an
interface, a component can only call external procedures
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that it imports explicitly, and it must define all procedures
exported by its interface. Thus, interfaces define privileges by
preventing components from calling non-imported procedures,
and enable components to define private procedures (that are
not exported in their interfaces). We will use the same notion
of interfaces in our target abstract machine.
The syntax of expressions, given below, is that of a stan-
dard imperative language with mutable buffers and mutually
recursive procedures. Each component C has local procedures
“C.P ” and private local buffers b. Loops are encoded using
recursive calls, sequencing is encoded as a binary operation,
and variables are encoded using buffers. Procedures take a
single argument, which by convention is always passed in the
first cell of the first buffer of the callee component. The only
first class values are integers i; these can be passed across com-
ponent boundaries using procedure calls and returns. Buffers
and procedures are second class.
e ::= i | e1 ⊗ e2 | if e then e1 else e2 | b[e] |
b[e1] := e2 | C.P(e) | exit
where ⊗ ∈ {; ,+,−,×,=,≤, . . .}.
We define a standard continuation-based small-step seman-
tics that reduces configurations cfg . It is deterministic for
programs that don’t cause undefined behavior.
cfg ::= (C, s, σ,K, e) K ::= [] | E::K
E ::= ⊗ e2 | i1 ⊗ | if  then e1 else e2 |
b[] := e2 | b[i1] :=  | C.P()
A configuration (C, s, σ,K, e) represents a call in progress
within component C, in which e is the expression being
reduced and K is the continuation for this expression, up to
the latest procedure call. Continuations are evaluation contexts,
here represented as lists of flat evaluation contexts E. We
denote by s a global state recording the values of the local
buffers for each component. Continuations for pending calls
are stored on a call stack σ, together with their call arguments’
values and the names of the compartments they execute in. We
omit the obvious definitions for call stacks σ and states s.
Evaluation starts as a call to a fixed procedure of a fixed
main component, and completes once this call completes,
or whenever the current expression e is exit. We illustrate
the small-step semantics with the three rules that deal with
procedure call evaluation. In these rules, ∆ is a mapping from
procedure identifiers to procedure bodies.
s′ = s[C ′, 0, 0 7→ i] σ′ = (C, s[C, 0, 0],K)::σ
∆ ` (C, s, σ, C ′.P ′()::K, i)→ (C ′, s′, σ′, [],∆[C ′, P ′])
s′ = s[C ′, 0, 0 7→ i′]
∆ ` (C, s, (C ′, i′,K)::σ, [], i)→ (C ′, s′, σ,K, i)
∆ ` (C, s, σ,K,C ′.P ′(e))→ (C, s, σ, C ′.P ′()::K, e)
As shown on the right-hand side of the first rule, a call starts
with an empty continuation and the procedure body ∆[C ′, P ′]
as the current expression. The first cell in the first buffer of the
callee compartment is updated with the call argument, while
information about the caller’s state when performing the call
gets pushed on the call stack σ. A call completes once an
empty continuation is reached and the current expression is
a value, as is the case in the left-hand side of the second
rule. In this case, the caller’s state is restored from the call
stack, and execution resumes with the call result i as the
current expression. The intermediate steps between the start
and the end of a call reduce the procedure body to a value, as
the last rule illustrates: Whenever e is not a value, reduction
deconstructs e into a subexpression e′ and a flat evaluation
context E such that e = E[e′], where E[e′] means filling the
hole  in E with e′. This expression e′ becomes the new
currently reduced expression, while E gets appended on top
of the current continuation K. Finally, when e is a value i and
the call has not completed (K 6= []), the next step is chosen
based on the flat evaluation context found on top of K, which
gets removed from K. In the left-hand side of the first rule, for
example, this flat evaluation context is C ′.P ′(), for which
the next chosen step, as shown on the right-hand side, is to
start a procedure call to C ′.P ′, using i as the call argument.
Since undefined behaviors are allowed to take the machine
to an arbitrary low-level state, it wouldn’t make much sense
to try to make the source-language semantics describe what
can happen if an undefined point is reached. We therefore
model them at the source level simply as stuckness (as done
for instance in CompCert [47]). In particular, reduction gets
stuck when trying to access or update a buffer out of bounds,
and the type safety theorem says that well-formed programs
can only go wrong (get stuck) by reducing to an out-of-
bounds operation on a buffer. A program is well-formed if
all the used buffers are defined, all imported components are
defined, all imported external procedures are public, and if the
names of all components are unique. Well-formedness extends
straightforwardly to configurations.
Theorem 4.1 (Partial type safety).
For any well-formed configuration cfg = (C, s, σ,K, e), one
of the following holds:
(1) cfg is a final configuration (either e is exit or else it is
a value and K and σ are both empty);
(2) cfg reduces in one step to a well-formed configuration;
(3) cfg is stuck and has one of the following forms:
(a) (C, s, σ, b[] :: K, i) where s[C, b, i] is undefined;
(b) (C, s, σ, b[i]:=::K, i′) where s[C, b, i] is undefined.
In the following, we use the term undefined behavior
configurations for the configurations described in (3), and we
say that a well-formed program is defined if reducing it never
reaches an undefined behavior configuration.
Target Our compiler targets a RISC-based abstract machine
extended with a compartmentalization mechanism, inspired
by a similar design featured in previous work [12]. Each
compartment in this target has its own private memory, which
cannot be directly accessed by others via loads, stores, or
jumps. Instead, compartments must communicate using special
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call and return instructions, which, as explained below, include
checks to ensure that the communication respects compartment
interfaces. (Note that this scheme requires a protected call
stack, which, in a real system, could be implemented e.g.,
using a shadow call stack [3], [27] or return capabilities [39].)
Because resource exhaustion and integer overflow issues are
orthogonal to our present concerns, we assume that words are
unbounded and memory is infinite.
The instruction set for our machine is mostly standard.
instr ::= Nop | Const i→ rd | Mov rs → rd
| Load ∗rp → rd | Store ∗rp ← rs
| Jump r | Jal r | Call C P | Return
| Binop r1 ⊗ r2 → rd | Bnz r i | Halt
Const i → rd puts an immediate value i into register rd.
Mov rs → rd copies the value in rs into rd. Load ∗rp → rd
and Store ∗rp ← rs operate on the memory location whose
address is stored in rp (the ∗ in the syntax of Load and Store
indicates that a pointer dereference is taking place), either
copying the value found at this location to rd or overwriting
the location with the content of rs. Jump r redirects control
flow to the address stored in r. Jal r (jump-and-link) does the
same but also communicates a return address in a dedicated
register rra, so that the target code can later resume execution
at the location that followed the Jal instruction. Call C P trans-
fers control to compartment C at the entry point for procedure
“C.P ”. Return C P transfers control back to the compartment
that called the current compartment. Binop r1 ⊗ r2 → rd
performs the mathematical operation ⊗ on the values in r1 and
r2 and writes the result to rd. Finally, Bnz r i (branch-non-
zero) is a conditional branch to an offset i, which is relative
to the current program counter. If r holds anything but value
zero, the branching happens, otherwise execution simply flows
to the next instruciton.
While Jal is traditionally used for procedure calls and
Jump for returns, in this machine they can only target the
current compartment’s memory. They are nonetheless useful
for optimizing compartment-local calls, which need no instru-
mentation; in a realistic setting, the instrumented primitives
Call and Return would likely come with monitoring overhead.
In the low-level semantics, we represent machine states
state as (C, σ,mem, reg, pc) where C is the currently executing
compartment, mem is a partitioned memory, reg is a register
file, pc is the program counter, and σ is a global protected
call stack. We assume a partial function decode from words
to instructions. We write ψ;E ` state → state’ to mean that
state reduces to state’ in an environment where component
interfaces are given by ψ and component entry points by E.
Here are the reduction rules for Call and Return:
mem[C, pc] = i decode i = Call C ′ P ′ pc′ = E[C ′][P ′]
C ′ = C ∨ C ′.P ′ ∈ ψ[C].import σ′ = (C, pc+1) :: σ
ψ;E ` (C, σ,mem, reg, pc)→ (C ′, σ′,mem, reg, pc′)
mem[C, pc] = i decode i = Return σ = (C ′, pc′) :: σ′
ψ;E ` (C, σ,mem, reg, pc)→ (C ′, σ′,mem, reg, pc′)
The Call rule checks that the call is valid with respect to
the current compartment’s interface—i.e., the target procedure
is imported by the current compartment—which ensures that
even if a compiled component is compromised it cannot
exceed its static privilege level. Then it puts the calling com-
partment’s name and program counter on the global protected
call stack σ. Finally, it redirects control to the entry point of the
called procedure. The Return instruction retrieves the caller’s
compartment and return address from the protected call stack
and resumes execution there.
Compiler We next define a simple compiler that produces
one low-level memory compartment for each high-level com-
ponent. Each compartment is internally split into buffers, the
code of procedures, and a local stack that can grow infinitely.
The local stack is used to store both intermediate results and
return addresses.
In standard calling conventions, the callee is generally
expected to restore the register values of the caller, if it has
modified them, before returning from a call. Here, however,
compiled components cannot assume that other components
will necessarily follow an agreed calling convention, so they
must save any register that may be needed later. This means,
for instance, that we save the value of the current call argument
on the local stack and write the local stack pointer to a fixed
location in the current compartment’s memory before any
cross-compartment call instruction is performed, so that the
compartment can restore them when it gets control back.
The compiler must also prevent a compromised compart-
ment from reading intermediate states from code in other
compartments that may be in the middle of a call to this one.
Intuitively, a secure compiler must prevent compromised com-
partments from distinguishing compiled components based on
low-level information that (fully defined) high-level attackers
don’t get. In the source language, only a single argument or
return value is communicated at call and return points. Hence,
besides preserving their values for later, the compiler ensures
that all3 registers are cleaned before transferring control to
other compartments.
The compiler implements a simple optimization for local
calls. Since all procedures of a component live in the same
address space and local calls don’t need instrumentation, these
calls can be implemented more efficiently using Jal and Jump
instructions. We therefore use different procedure entry points
for component-local and cross-component calls, and we skip,
3 Technically speaking, we believe that, in our very simple setting, the
compiler could choose not to clean unused registers and still be secure.
However, our proof relies on compiled components cleaning all registers
except the one that holds the call argument or return value. Indeed, not
cleaning unused registers makes things harder because it can provide a covert
channel for two compromised compartments between which interfaces would
forbid any direct communication. These compartments could now exchange
values through uncleared registers by interacting with the same unsuspecting
uncompromised component. We conjecture that this possible cooperation
between compromised components doesn’t yield more attacker power in
our case. However, in a setting where registers could be used to transmit
capabilities, this would give more power to the attacker, so our compiler
clears all registers but one, which also simplifies our proof.
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for local calls, the steps that store and restore register values
and clean registers.
Because we do not check bounds when compiling buffer
read and write operations, buffer overflows can corrupt a
compartment’s memory in arbitrary ways. Consequently, many
buffer overflow attacks can be reproduced even in our simple
setting, including, due to the local-call optimization, return-
oriented programming attacks [14], [66]. In return-oriented
programming, an attacker overwrites return addresses on the
local stack to produce an unexpected sequence of instructions
of his choice by reusing parts of the code of component-
local procedures. In our setting, buffer overflow attacks thus
enable compiled components to shoot themselves in the foot
by storing beyond the end of a buffer and into the local call
stack.
We assume compiler correctness as stated below for our
compiler. Note that, in the presence of partial type safety,
(Theorem 4.1), proving either (1) or (2) below is enough to
get the other.
Assumption 4.2 (Whole-program compiler correctness).
∀P. P defined⇒
(1) P terminates ⇐⇒ P↓ terminates ∧
(2) P diverges ⇐⇒ P↓ diverges
Instantiating structured full abstraction We define pro-
gram shapes, partial programs, and contexts in a similar way
to Theorem 3.4, as detailed below. More precisely, we use
isomorphic definitions so that we can later apply this theorem.
A program shape s is the pairing of a mapping from
component names to component interfaces and a set that
indicates uncompromised components. In the rest of the paper,
we implicitly restrict our attention to well-formed shapes. A
shape is well-formed when (1) all component interfaces in the
shape only import procedures from components that are part
of the shape, and (2) these procedures are exported according
to the shape.
High-level partial programs P and contexts A are defined
as mappings from component names to component definitions.
A high-level partial program P has shape •s when it defines
exactly the components that are marked as uncompromised in
s, with definitions that satisfy the corresponding interfaces, and
when it moreover satisfies the simple well-formedness condi-
tion that all the local buffers it uses are defined. A high-level
context A has shape ◦s under the same conditions, adapted for
compromised components instead of uncompromised ones.
A low-level partial program p or context a is formed by
pairing a partitioned memory with a mapping from proce-
dure identifiers to entry points. This choice is isomorphic
to having sets of named compartment memories with entry
point annotations. A low-level partial program p has shape
•s when the partitioned memory has partitions under exactly
the component names that are marked as uncompromised in s,
and the entry point mapping provides addresses for exactly the
procedures that are exported by these components according
to s. A low-level context a has shape ◦s under the same
conditions, adapted for compromised components instead of
uncompromised ones.
We say that a high-level partial program P ∈• s is
fully defined with respect to contexts of shape ◦s when it
cannot be blamed for undefined behavior when interacting
with such contexts: for every A ∈◦ s, either reducing A[P ]
never reaches an undefined behavior configuration, or else the
current component in this undefined behavior configuration
belongs to A. Similarly, a high-level context A ∈• s is fully
defined with respect to programs of shape ◦s when it cannot
be blamed for undefined behavior when interacting with such
programs.
Because we perform a point-wise compilation of high-
level programs, separate compilation (Definition 3.5) trivially
holds for our compiler. Combining it with whole-program
compiler correctness (Assumption 4.2) immediately leads to
the following corollary:
Corollary 4.3 (Separate compilation correctness).
∀s,A ∈◦ s, P ∈• s.
P fully defined wrt. contexts of shape ◦s⇒
A fully defined wrt. programs of shape •s⇒
(1) A[P ] terminates ⇐⇒ A↓ [P↓] terminates ∧
(2) A[P ] diverges ⇐⇒ A↓ [P↓] diverges
Proof technique for structured full abstraction Trace
semantics were initially proposed by Jeffrey and Rathke [36],
[37] to define fully abstract models for high-level languages.
Patrignani et al. later showed how to use trace semantics [59]
to prove full abstraction for a compiler targeting machine
code [58].
This proof technique is well suited for deterministic tar-
get languages such as machine code and proceeds in two
steps. First, we devise a trace semantics for low-level partial
programs and contexts and relate it to the target machine’s
operational semantics (e.g., by proving it fully abstract [59]).
This trace semantics will provide a set of traces for every
partial program, describing all the execution paths that this
program can reach by interacting with an arbitrary context.
Second, we use the trace semantics to characterize the interac-
tion between an arbitrary low-level context and, separately, two
compiled programs that this context distinguishes, resulting in
two traces with a common prefix followed by different actions.
We can then use these traces to construct a high-level attacker,
proving that this attacker distinguishes between the two source
programs.
As our proof demonstrates, proving the trace semantics fully
abstract is not a mandatory first step in the technique. Instead,
we relate our trace semantics to the operational one using
two weaker trace composition and decomposition conditions
(Lemma 4.5 and Lemma 4.6), adapted from the key lemmas
that Jeffrey and Rathke used to prove their trace semantics
fully abstract [36], [37]. This reduces proof effort, since
proving a trace semantics fully abstract typically requires
proving a third lemma with a trace-mapping argument of its
own [36], [37], [59].
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Adapting the technique to undefined behavior is straight-
forward, essentially amounting to proving standard full ab-
straction for the safe subset of the language. Then one simply
proves that the context produced by the mapping is fully
defined, thus safe. Adapting to a closed world, however, takes
more work.
The trace semantics that have been used previously to
prove full abstraction characterize the interaction between a
partial program and arbitrary contexts. The context’s shape
is typically constructed as reduction goes, based on the steps
that the context takes in the generated trace. For instance, if
the trace said that the context performs a call, then the target
procedure would be appended to the context’s interface so that
this call becomes possible. For structured full abstraction, we
want a finer-grained trace semantics that enables reasoning
about the interaction with contexts of a specific shape. We
achieve this by making the shape a parameter to the reduction
relation underlying our trace semantics. To make sure that
traces are compatible with this shape, we also keep track
of the current compartment during reduction. This allows
us to generate only context steps that adhere to the current
compartment’s interface, and hence to the context’s shape.
In particular, the context will only be able to call program
procedures for which (1) there is a context compartment whose
interface explicitly imports the target procedure, thus granting
the privilege to call that procedure, and (2) this other context
compartment is reachable from the current compartment via a
chain of cross-compartment calls or returns within the context.
Moving to a closed world also makes the trace mapping
argument harder. The one from Patrignani et al. [58], for
instance, relies on changes in the context’s shape, e.g., adding
a helper component to the context that is not present in the low
level. This is no longer possible for structured full abstraction,
where the context shape is fixed.
Trace semantics for the low-level language We define
a trace semantics in which traces are finite words over an
alphabet Eα of external actions, alternating between program
external actions “γ!” and context external actions “γ?”. We
treat external actions as moves in a two-player game, viewing
the context and the partial program as the players. The trace
semantics is parameterized by a shape s, which the two players
have. External actions either transfer control to the other player
or end the game.
Eα ::= γ! | γ? γ ::= Callreg C P | Returnreg | X
Traces (Eα∗) track the external actions (γ) performed by the
context and the program. The first kind of external action
is cross-boundary communication, which corresponds to the
use of instrumented call instructions Call C P and Return
when they transfer control to a compartment that belongs to
the opponent. For these external actions, traces keep track of
the instruction used together with reg, the values held by all
registers when the instruction is issued. The second kind of
external action is program termination, which we denote with
a tick X and which the opponent cannot answer (X ends the
game). It corresponds to the use of an instruction that makes
execution stuck, such as Halt.
At any point where it has control, a player can take internal
actions (any instruction that neither terminates execution nor
transfers control to the opponent); these are not reflected in
the trace. In particular, cross-compartment communication is
considered an internal action when it transfers control to
a compartment that belongs to the current player. Besides
halting, a player can also end the game by triggering an infinite
sequence of internal actions, making execution diverge. In the
trace, this will correspond to not making any move: the trace
observed thus far will be a maximal trace for the interaction
between the program and context involved, i.e., any extension
of this trace will not be shared by both the program and the
context.
Intuitively, a program p ∈• s has trace t if it answers with
the program actions described in t when facing a context a ∈◦
s that produces the context actions described in t. Similarly,
a program a ∈◦ s has trace t if it answers with the context
actions described in t when facing a program p ∈• s that
produces the program actions described in t. We define Tr◦s(p)
to be the set of traces of a partial program p with respect to
contexts of shape ◦s, and Tr•s(a) to be the set of traces of a
context a with respect to programs of shape •s.
The player that starts the game is the one that owns the
main component according to s. For each player, the trace
semantics is deterministic with respect to its own actions
and nondeterministic with respect to the opponent’s actions.
All possible actions an actual opponent could take have a
corresponding nondeterministic choice, which is formalized
by a property we call trace extensibility.
Lemma 4.4 (Trace extensibility).
∀t, s, p ∈• s, a ∈◦ s.
(t ∈ Tr◦s(p) ∧ t.γ? ∈ Tr•s(a)⇒ t.γ? ∈ Tr◦s(p)) ∧
(t ∈ Tr•s(a) ∧ t.γ! ∈ Tr◦s(p)⇒ t.γ! ∈ Tr•s(a))
Nondeterminism disappears once we choose a particular
opponent for a player, as the two key lemmas below illustrate.
Lemma 4.5 (Trace decomposition).
∀s, p ∈• s, a ∈◦ s. a[p] terminates⇒
∃t. t ends with X ∧ t ∈ Tr◦s(p) ∩ Tr•s(a)
Trace decomposition is stated for terminating programs. It
extracts the interaction between a program p and a context a
with dual shapes by looking at how a[p] reduces, synthesizing
that interaction into a trace t. Because execution terminates,
this trace ends with a termination marker.
Lemma 4.6 (Trace composition).
∀t, s, p ∈• s, a ∈◦ s. t ∈ Tr◦s(p) ∩ Tr•s(a)⇒
(∀Eα. (t.Eα) 6∈ Tr◦s(p) ∩ Tr•s(a))⇒
(a[p] terminates ⇐⇒ t ends with X)
Trace composition is the opposite of trace decomposition,
reconstructing a sequence of reductions based on synthesized
interaction information. It considers a program and a context
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with dual shapes, that share a common trace t. The condition
on the second line states that the game has ended: trace t
cannot be extended by any action Eα such that the two
players share trace “t.Eα”. Under these assumptions, trace
composition tells us that one of the following holds: either (1)
the trace ends with a termination marker X and putting p in
context a will produce a terminating program, or (2) the trace
does not end in X and putting p in context a will produce
a diverging program. Intuitively, if the game has ended but
there is no termination marker, it must be because one of the
players went into an infinite sequence of internal actions and
will neither give control back nor terminate.
While the statement of these lemmas is quite close to that
used in an open world setting [36], [37], the trace semantics
itself has to be adapted in order to prove them in the presence
of our closed world assumption. To this end, we incorporate
internal actions within the trace semantics, thus adding more
options to the nondeterministic choice of the next context
action, which allows us to track at any point the currently
executing compartment. When in control, a player can only
perform communicating actions allowed by the interface of
the current compartment. This restricts external actions as
required, while also making it possible to internally switch the
current compartment through allowed internal actions. Using
our semantics, we thus end up with finer-grained traces that
include internal communication, which can be directly mapped
to high-level attackers (Assumption 4.9). The traces we use
otherwise are obtained by erasing internal actions from the
finer-grained traces.
Proof of SCC We prove our instance of structured full
abstraction, which implies SCC by Theorem 3.4 since we have
isomorphic definitions to the ones in §3.
Theorem 4.7 (Structured full abstraction).
Our compiler satisfies structured full abstraction.
Recall that the basic idea behind the proof technique is to
extract two traces that characterize the interaction between a
low-level context and two compiled fully defined high-level
programs, and then to map these two traces to a fully defined
high-level context. The high-level context should reproduce
the context actions described in the traces when facing the
same programs as the low-level context.
Unfortunately, a compiled fully defined context cannot
reproduce any arbitrary low-level trace, because the values
transmitted in registers are part of external communication
actions in low-level traces: As enforced by the compiler,
these contexts always clear all registers but the one used for
communication before giving control to the program. They can
thus only produce traces in which registers are cleared in all
context actions, which we call canonical traces. We denote by
ζ(γ) the operation that rewrites action γ so that all registers
but one are clear. A canonical trace ζ◦(t) can be obtained from
an arbitrary trace t by replacing all context actions “γ?” by
“ζ(γ)?”. We call this operation trace canonicalization.
As we will see, being able to reproduce arbitrary canonical
traces gives enough distinguishing power to the high-level
context. The reason is that, because they can’t trust other
compartments, compiled fully defined components never read
values transmitted in registers with the exception of the one
used for communication. As a consequence, these components
cannot distinguish context external actions based on the con-
tent of these unread registers, which are exactly the ones a
compiled fully defined context cleans. Fully defined programs
thus perform the exact same actions when facing a trace t or
its canonicalization ζ◦(t), as formalized by Lemma 4.8. This
means that having the high-level attacker reproduce canonical
traces instead of the original traces of the low-level context
will be enough to lead compiled programs into reproducing
the actions they took when facing the low-level context.
Lemma 4.8 (Canonicalization).
∀t, s, P ∈• s.
P fully defined wrt. contexts of shape ◦s⇒
t ∈ Tr◦s(P↓) ⇐⇒ ζ◦(t) ∈ Tr◦s(P↓)
The definability assumption below gives a characterization
of our mapping from a canonical trace t and an action γ1 to a
compiled fully defined context A↓ that reproduces the context
actions in t and, depending on the next action γ the program
takes, ends the game with either termination (if ζ(γ) = ζ(γ1))
or divergence (if ζ(γ) 6= ζ(γ1)). The context A↓ will thus
distinguish a program p producing trace “t.γ1!” from any
program producing “t.γ!” with ζ(γ) 6= ζ(γ1).
Assumption 4.9 (Definability).
∀t, γ1, s. t = ζ◦(t) ∧ (∃p ∈• s. (t.γ1!) ∈ Tr◦s(p))⇒
∃A ∈◦ s. A fully defined wrt. programs of shape •s ∧
(1) t ∈ Tr•s(A↓) ∧
(2) (γ1 6= X⇒ (t.γ1!.X?) ∈ Tr•s(A↓)) ∧
(3) ∀γ. if ζ(γ) 6= ζ(γ1) then ∀γ′. (t.γ!.γ′?) 6∈ Tr•s(A↓)
The definability assumption gives us a fully defined context
that follows trace t (part 1) and that, if given control afterwards
via action “γ!” such that γ 6= X, acts as follows: if γ = γ1 the
context terminates (2) and if the context can distinguish γ from
γ1, it will make execution diverge by not issuing any action
γ′ (3). Since it is a compiled fully defined context, A↓ can
only access values transmitted using register rcom, the register
that holds the call argument or return value. So A↓ can only
distinguish between γ and γ1 when they differ in rcom, which
is captured formally by the ζ(γ) 6= ζ(γ1) condition.
Proving this assumption (even on paper) would be quite
tedious, so we settled for testing its correctness using
QuickCheck [17]. We built an algorithm (in OCaml) that
constructs A out of t. More precisely, the algorithm inputs a
trace with internal actions (the finer-grained trace that erases
to t) and builds a context A that reproduces context internal
and external actions as prescribed by that trace. Execution
will afterwards resume at a different point in A depending
on the next action taken by the program. At each such
point, A will either terminate execution or make it diverge
depending on whether the program action is distinguishable
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from action γ1. Because the trace taken as input already
includes internal actions, we do not have to reconstruct them,
hence our algorithm is not more difficult to devise than in an
open-world setting [58]. In the following, we assume that the
algorithm is correct, i.e., that Assumption 4.9 holds. We can
now turn to the main theorem.
Detailed proof of structured full abstraction. Consider a low-
level attacker a ∈◦ s distinguishing two fully defined partial
programs P,Q ∈• s after compilation. Suppose without loss
of generality that a[P ↓] terminates and a[Q↓] diverges. We
build a high-level attacker A ∈◦ s that is fully defined with
respect to programs of shape •s and can distinguish between
P and Q.
We can first apply trace decomposition (Lemma 4.5) to a
and P↓ to get a trace ti ∈ Tr◦s(P↓) that ends with X, such
that ti ∈ Tr•s(a). Call tp the longest prefix of ti such that tp ∈
Tr◦s(Q↓). Because trace sets are prefix-closed by construction,
we know that tp ∈ Tr◦s(P↓) ∩ Tr•s(a).
Moreover, tp is necessarily a strict prefix of ti: otherwise,
we could apply trace composition (Lemma 4.6) and get that
a[Q↓] terminates, a contradiction. So there exists an external
action Eα such that trace “tp.Eα” is a prefix of ti. Now
Eα cannot be a context action, or else trace extensibility
(Lemma 4.4) would imply that “tp.Eα” is a trace of Tr◦s(Q↓),
which is incompatible with tp being the longest prefix of ti in
Tr◦s(Q↓). Therefore, Eα is a program action, i.e., there exists
γ1 such that “Eα = γ1!”. Intuitively, P↓ and Q↓ take the same
external actions until the end of tp, where P↓ takes external
action “γ1!” and Q↓ does not (it takes either a different action
γ 6= γ1 or no external action at all).
Now, let tc be the canonicalization of trace tp, i.e.,
tc = ζ◦(tp). By canonicalization (Lemma 4.8), “tc.γ1!” =
ζ◦(tp.γ1!) is a trace of P↓. We can thus use apply definability
(Assumption 4.9) to trace tc and action γ1, using P ↓∈• s
as a witness having trace “tc.γ1!”. This yields a fully defined
context A ∈◦ s such that:
(1) tc ∈ Tr•s(A↓),
(2) γ1 6= X⇒ (tc.γ1!.X?) ∈ Tr•s(A↓),
(3) ∀γ, γ′. (tc.γ!.γ′?) ∈ Tr•s(A↓)⇒ ζ(γ) = ζ(γ1).
We now show that these conditions imply that A ↓ [P ↓]
terminates while A↓ [Q↓] diverges.
First, we look at P↓. Consider the case where γ1 = X. In
this case, by applying trace extensibility to A↓ in (1), we get
that “tc.X!” is a trace of A↓, so trace composition allows us
to conclude that A↓ [P↓] terminates. Now if γ1 6= X then this
action gives back control to the context, which, given (2), will
perform action “X?”. Applying trace extensibility to P↓, P↓
has trace “tc.γ1!.X?”, so we can apply trace composition and
deduce that A↓ [P↓] terminates in this case as well.
Now, regarding Q ↓, we first obtain the following by
applying canonicalization to tp, “tp.X!”, and “tp.γ1!”:
(a) tc = ζ◦(tp) ∈ Tr◦s(Q↓),
(b) (tc.X!) = ζ◦(tp.X!) ∈ Tr◦s(Q↓)⇒ (tp.X!) ∈ Tr◦s(Q↓),
(c) (tc.γ1!) = ζ◦(tp.γ1!) ∈ Tr◦s(Q↓)⇒ (tp.γ1!) ∈ Tr◦s(Q↓).
After following trace tc, which Q↓ has from (a), Q↓ cannot
perform a terminating action: otherwise using (b) and trace
extensibility for a and tp, we could apply trace composition
to trace “tp.X” and get that a[Q ↓] terminates, which is a
contradiction. Q↓ cannot perform action γ1 either, since (c)
would then violate the fact that tp is the longest prefix of ti
in Tr◦s(Q↓). So Q↓ only has two options left. The first is to
perform no external action by going into an infinite sequence
of internal transitions. In this case, using (1), we can apply
trace composition to get that A↓ [Q↓] diverges. The second
option is to give control back to the context using an external
action γ so that X 6= γ 6= γ1. Because fully defined compiled
programs clean registers, they only yield canonical actions, i.e.
γ = ζ(γ) ∧ γ1 = ζ(γ1). Combined with (3), this entails that
if A↓ produced an action γ′, we would have γ = γ1, which
is false. Hence, A↓ doesn’t produce any action: it goes into
an infinite sequence of local transitions. We can again apply
trace composition to get that A↓ [Q↓] diverges.
We finally apply separate compiler correctness (Corol-
lary 4.3) to conclude the proof.
5 Related Work
Fully abstract compilation Fully abstract compilation was
introduced in the seminal work of Martı´n Abadi [1] and later
investigated by the academic community. (Much before this,
the concept of full abstraction was coined by Milner [48].)
For instance, Ahmed et al. [9]–[11], [56] proved the full
abstraction of type-preserving compiler passes for functional
languages and devised proof techniques for typed target lan-
guages. Abadi and Plotkin [6] and Jagadeesan et al. [35]
expressed the protection provided by a mitigation technique
called address space layout randomization as a probabilistic
variant of full abstraction. Fournet et al. [31] devised a fully
abstract compiler from a subset of ML to JavaScript.
Patrignani et al. [45], [58] were recently the first to study
fully abstract compilation to machine code, starting from
single modules written in simple, idealized object-oriented
and functional languages and targeting hardware architectures
featuring a new coarse-grained isolation mechanism. Until
recently, they studied fully abstract compilers that by design
violate our separate compilation property, so they cannot be
applied to our compartmentalizing compilation setting.
In recent parallel work, Patrignani et al. [61] proposed an
extension of their compilation scheme to protecting multiple
components from each other. The attacker model they con-
sider is different, especially since their source language does
not have undefined behavior. Still, if their source language
were extended with unsafe features, our SCC property could
possibly hold for their compiler.
Patrignani, Devriese et al. [21], [59] also proposed proof
techniques for full abstraction that work for untyped target
languages, and more recently proved full abstraction by ap-
proximate back-translation for a compiler between the simply
typed and the untyped lambda calculus and fully formalized
this proof in Coq [22]. As opposed to our Coq proof for
the instance from §4, which is done under well-specified
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assumptions but not complete, the proof of Devriese et al.
is assumption free.
Formal reasoning about compartmentalized code SCC is
orthogonal to formal techniques for reasoning about compart-
mentalized software: SCC allows transferring security guaran-
tees for compartmentalized code written in a source language
to machine code via compartmentalizing compilation, but SCC
itself does not provide effective reasoning principles to obtain
those security guarantees in the first place. The literature
contains interesting work on formally characterizing the secu-
rity benefits of compartmentalization. Promising approaches
include Jia et al.’s work on System M [38], and Devriese et
al.’s work on logical relations for a core calculus based on
JavaScript [23], both of which allow bounding the behavior
of a program fragment based on the interface or capabilities
it has access to. One significant challenge we attack in this
paper is languages with undefined behaviors, while in these
other works illegal actions such as accessing a buffer out of
bounds must be detected and make the program halt.
Verifying correct low-level compartmentalization Recent
work focused on formally verifying the correctness of low-
level compartmentalization mechanisms based on software
fault isolation [42], [49], [73] or tagged hardware [12]. That
work, however, only considers the correctness of the low-
level compartmentalization mechanism, not the compiler and
not high-level security properties and reasoning principles for
code written in a programming language with components.
Communication between low-level compartments is generally
done by jumping to a specified set of entry points, while
the model we consider in §4 is more structured and enforces
correct calls and returns.
Finally, seL4 is a verified operating system microker-
nel [41], that uses a capability system to separate user level
threads and for which correct access control [65] and nonin-
terference properties [50] were proved formally.
6 Conclusion and Future Work
We have introduced a new secure compartmentalizing com-
pilation property, related it to the established notion of full
abstraction, and applied our property in a carefully simplified
setting: a small imperative language with procedures compil-
ing to a compartmentalized abstract machine. This lays the
formal foundations for studying the secure compilation of
mutually distrustful components written in unsafe languages.
In the future we plan to build on this groundwork to study
more realistic source and target languages, compilers, and en-
forcement mechanisms. In the long run, we would like to apply
this to the C language by devising a secure compartmentalizing
variant of CompCert that targets a tag-based reference moni-
tor [12] running on a real RISC processor [19]. We have in fact
started working towards this long term goal [39], but this will
take time to achieve. Beyond tagged hardware, we would also
like to implement the abstract compartmentalization machine
from §4 in terms of various enforcement other mechanisms,
including: process-level sandboxing [13], [33], [40], [63], soft-
ware fault isolation (SFI) [71], capability machines [70], and
multi-PMA systems [61]. As we target lower-level machines,
new problems will appear: for instance we need to deal with
the fact that memory is finite and resource exhaustion errors
cannot be hidden from the attacker, which will require slightly
weakening the security property. Finally, we would like to
study more interesting compartmentalization models including
dynamic component creation and nested components, and the
way these extensions influence the security property.
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